diff --git a/exosphere/src/smc_user.c b/exosphere/src/smc_user.c index cc77f619d..316860876 100644 --- a/exosphere/src/smc_user.c +++ b/exosphere/src/smc_user.c @@ -43,16 +43,16 @@ uint32_t user_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) { uint8_t modulus[0x100]; uint8_t exponent[0x100]; uint8_t input[0x100]; - + upage_ref_t page_ref; - + /* Validate size. */ if (args->X[4] == 0 || args->X[4] > 0x100 || (args->X[4] & 3) != 0) { return 2; } - + size_t exponent_size = (size_t)args->X[4]; - + void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1]; void *user_exponent = (void *)args->X[2]; void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[3]; @@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ uint32_t user_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) { } if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, exponent, user_exponent, exponent_size) == 0) { return 2; - } + } if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) { return 2; } - + set_exp_mod_done(false); /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */ set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, exponent, exponent_size); se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler); - + return 0; } @@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ uint32_t user_get_random_bytes(smc_args_t *args) { if (args->X[1] > 0x38) { return 2; } - + size_t size = (size_t)args->X[1]; - + flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size); se_generate_random(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_RNGKEY, random_bytes, size); flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size); - + memcpy(&args->X[1], random_bytes, size); return 0; } @@ -100,36 +100,36 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) { uint8_t kek_source[0x10]; uint64_t kek[2]; uint64_t sealed_kek[2]; - + wrapped_kek[0] = args->X[1]; wrapped_kek[1] = args->X[2]; - + unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3]; - + if (master_key_rev > 0) { master_key_rev -= 1; /* GenerateAesKek offsets by one. */ } - + if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) { return 2; } - + uint64_t packed_options = args->X[4]; if (packed_options > 0xFF) { return 2; } - + /* Switched the output based on how the system was booted. */ uint8_t mask_id = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 1) & 3); - + /* Switches the output based on how it will be used. */ uint8_t usecase = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 5) & 3); - + /* Switched the output based on whether it should be console unique. */ bool is_personalized = (int)(packed_options & 1); - + bool is_recovery_boot = configitem_is_recovery_boot(); - + /* Mask 2 is only allowed when booted from recovery. */ if (mask_id == 2 && !is_recovery_boot) { return 2; @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) { if (mask_id == 1 && is_recovery_boot) { return 2; } - + /* Masks 0, 3 are allowed all the time. */ - + const uint8_t kek_seeds[4][0x10] = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, {0xA2, 0xAB, 0xBF, 0x9C, 0x92, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0xE3, 0x78, 0x79, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xA5, 0x74}, @@ -153,12 +153,12 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) { {0x76, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x34, 0x93, 0x2D, 0xE1, 0x84, 0x24, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x65, 0x55, 0x04, 0x65, 0x81}, {0xAF, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x46, 0xC9, 0x0B} }; - + /* Create kek source. */ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { kek_source[i] = kek_seeds[usecase][i] ^ kek_masks[mask_id][i]; } - + unsigned int keyslot; if (is_personalized) { /* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */ @@ -174,39 +174,39 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) { } else { keyslot = mkey_get_keyslot(master_key_rev); } - + /* Derive kek. */ decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, kek_source, 0x10); se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, kek, 0x10, wrapped_kek, 0x10); - - + + /* Seal kek. */ seal_key(sealed_kek, 0x10, kek, 0x10, usecase); - + args->X[1] = sealed_kek[0]; args->X[2] = sealed_kek[1]; - + return 0; } uint32_t user_load_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t sealed_kek[2]; uint64_t wrapped_key[2]; - + uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1]; if (keyslot > 3) { return 2; } - + /* Copy keydata */ sealed_kek[0] = args->X[2]; sealed_kek[1] = args->X[3]; wrapped_key[0] = args->X[4]; wrapped_key[1] = args->X[5]; - + /* Unseal the kek. */ unseal_key(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, sealed_kek, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_AES); - + /* Unwrap the key. */ decrypt_data_into_keyslot(keyslot, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, wrapped_key, 0x10); return 0; @@ -234,19 +234,19 @@ uint32_t crypt_aes_done_handler(void) { uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) { uint32_t keyslot = args->X[1] & 3; uint32_t mode = (args->X[1] >> 4) & 3; - + uint64_t iv_ctr[2]; iv_ctr[0] = args->X[2]; iv_ctr[1] = args->X[3]; - + uint32_t in_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[4]); uint32_t out_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[5]); - + size_t size = args->X[6]; if (size & 0xF) { generic_panic(); } - + set_crypt_aes_done(false); uint64_t result = 0; @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) { result = 1; break; } - + return result; } @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) { uint8_t key[0x10]; unsigned int master_key_rev; bool should_mask; - + wrapped_key[0] = args->X[1]; wrapped_key[1] = args->X[2]; if (args->X[4] > MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) { @@ -288,9 +288,9 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) { return 2; } should_mask = args->X[3] != 0; - + unsigned int keyslot; - + /* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */ if (mkey_get_revision() >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_CURRENT) { if (master_key_rev >= 2) { @@ -301,18 +301,18 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) { } else { keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY; } - + if (fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() < 0x7F) { /* On dev units, use a fixed "all-zeroes" seed. */ /* Yes, this data really is all-zero in actual TrustZone .rodata. */ uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9}; uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E}; - + flush_dcache_range(key, key + 0x10); se_aes_ctr_crypt(keyslot, key, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_ctr, 0x10); flush_dcache_range(key, key + 0x10); - + if (should_mask) { for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) { key[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i]; @@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) { decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, retail_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10); se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, key, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10); } - - - args->X[1] = key[0]; - args->X[2] = key[1]; + + + args->X[1] = read64le(key, 0); + args->X[2] = read64le(key, 8); return 0; } @@ -335,27 +335,27 @@ uint32_t user_compute_cmac(smc_args_t *args) { uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1]; void *user_address = (void *)args->X[2]; size_t size = (size_t)args->X[3]; - + uint8_t user_data[0x400]; uint64_t result_cmac[2]; upage_ref_t page_ref; - + /* Validate keyslot and size. */ if (keyslot > 3 || args->X[3] > 0x400) { return 2; } - + if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) { return 2; } - + flush_dcache_range(user_data, user_data + size); se_compute_aes_128_cmac(keyslot, result_cmac, 0x10, user_data, size); - + /* Copy CMAC out. */ args->X[1] = result_cmac[0]; args->X[2] = result_cmac[1]; - + return 0; } @@ -363,13 +363,13 @@ uint32_t user_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t sealed_kek[2]; uint64_t wrapped_key[2]; bool is_personalized; - + uint8_t user_data[0x400]; void *user_address; size_t size; upage_ref_t page_ref; - + /* Copy keydata */ sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1]; sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2]; @@ -381,23 +381,23 @@ uint32_t user_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) { size = (size_t)args->X[5]; wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6]; wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7]; - + if (is_personalized && size != 0x240) { return 2; } if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x220 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) { return 2; } - + if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) { return 2; } - + /* Ensure that our private key is 0x100 bytes. */ if (gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAOAEP, is_personalized) < 0x100) { return 2; } - + memcpy(g_rsa_oaep_exponent, user_data, 0x100); return 0; } @@ -406,13 +406,13 @@ uint32_t user_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t sealed_kek[2]; uint64_t wrapped_key[2]; bool is_personalized; - + uint8_t user_data[0x400]; void *user_address; size_t size; upage_ref_t page_ref; - + /* Copy keydata */ sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1]; sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2]; @@ -424,28 +424,28 @@ uint32_t user_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) { size = (size_t)args->X[5]; wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6]; wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7]; - + if (size > 0x240) { return 2; } - + if (is_personalized && size < 0x31) { return 2; } if (!is_personalized && (size < 0x11 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) { return 2; } - + if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) { return 2; } - + size_t out_size; - + if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAPRIVATE, is_personalized)) == 0) { return 2; } - + if (secure_copy_to_user(&page_ref, user_address, user_data, size) == 0) { return 2; } @@ -458,13 +458,13 @@ uint32_t user_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t sealed_kek[2]; uint64_t wrapped_key[2]; bool is_personalized; - + uint8_t user_data[0x400]; void *user_address; size_t size; upage_ref_t page_ref; - + /* Copy keydata */ sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1]; sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2]; @@ -476,41 +476,41 @@ uint32_t user_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) { size = (size_t)args->X[5]; wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6]; wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7]; - + if (is_personalized && size != 0x130) { return 2; } if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x110 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) { return 2; } - + if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) { return 2; } - + size_t out_size; - + /* Ensure that our key is non-zero bytes. */ if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_SECUREEXPMOD, is_personalized)) == 0) { return 2; } - + /* Copy key to global. */ if (out_size <= 0x100) { memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, out_size); } else { memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, 0x100); } - + return 0; } uint32_t user_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) { uint8_t modulus[0x100]; uint8_t input[0x100]; - + upage_ref_t page_ref; - + void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1]; void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2]; @@ -524,25 +524,25 @@ uint32_t user_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) { if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) { return 2; } - + set_exp_mod_done(false); /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */ set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, 0x100); se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler); - + return 0; } uint32_t user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) { uint8_t modulus[0x100]; uint8_t wrapped_key[0x100]; - + upage_ref_t page_ref; - + void *user_wrapped_key = (void *)args->X[1]; void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2]; unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[7]; - + if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) { return 2; } @@ -557,34 +557,34 @@ uint32_t user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) { if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) { return 2; } - + set_exp_mod_done(false); - + /* Expected label_hash occupies args->X[3] to args->X[6]. */ tkey_set_expected_label_hash(&args->X[3]); - + tkey_set_master_key_rev(master_key_rev); - + /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */ set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_rsa_oaep_exponent, 0x100); se_exp_mod(0, wrapped_key, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler); - + return 0; } uint32_t user_load_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2]; - + uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1]; if (keyslot > 3) { return 2; } - + /* Copy keydata */ sealed_titlekey[0] = args->X[2]; sealed_titlekey[1] = args->X[3]; - + /* Unseal the key. */ unseal_titlekey(keyslot, sealed_titlekey, 0x10); return 0; @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ uint32_t user_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) { uint64_t aes_wrapped_titlekey[2]; uint8_t titlekey[0x10]; uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2]; - + aes_wrapped_titlekey[0] = args->X[1]; aes_wrapped_titlekey[1] = args->X[2]; unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3]; diff --git a/exosphere/src/titlekey.c b/exosphere/src/titlekey.c index f3683f7b5..ec5b96e8c 100644 --- a/exosphere/src/titlekey.c +++ b/exosphere/src/titlekey.c @@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed, if (seed_size >= 0xE0) { generic_panic(); } - + size_t hash_buf_size = seed_size + 4; memcpy(hash_buf, seed, seed_size); - - uint32_t round = 0; - + + uint32_t round_num = 0; + uint8_t *p_out = (uint8_t *)masked; while (masked_size) { @@ -45,21 +45,17 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed, if (cur_size > 0x20) { cur_size = 0x20; } - - hash_buf[seed_size + 0] = (uint8_t)((round >> 24) & 0xFF); - hash_buf[seed_size + 1] = (uint8_t)((round >> 16) & 0xFF); - hash_buf[seed_size + 2] = (uint8_t)((round >> 8) & 0xFF); - hash_buf[seed_size + 3] = (uint8_t)((round >> 0) & 0xFF); - round++; + + write32be(hash_buf, seed_size, round_num++); flush_dcache_range(hash_buf, hash_buf + hash_buf_size); se_calculate_sha256(cur_hash, hash_buf, hash_buf_size); - + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < cur_size; i++) { *p_out ^= cur_hash[i]; p_out++; } - + masked_size -= cur_size; } } @@ -68,7 +64,7 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si if (src_size != 0x100) { generic_panic(); } - + /* RSA Wrapped titlekeys use RSA-OAEP. */ /* Message is of the form prefix || maskedSalt || maskedDB. */ /* maskedSalt = salt ^ MGF1(maskedDB) */ @@ -77,43 +73,43 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si /* DB is of the form label_hash || 00....01 || wrapped_titlekey. */ /* label_hash is, in practice, a constant in es .rodata. */ /* I have no idea why Nintendo did this, it should be either nonconstant (in tik) or in tz .rodata. */ - + uint8_t *message = (uint8_t *)src; - + /* Prefix should always be zero. */ if (*message != 0) { return 0; } - + uint8_t *salt = message + 1; uint8_t *db = message + 0x21; - + /* This will be passed to smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey. */ uint8_t *expected_label_hash = (uint8_t *)(&g_tkey_expected_label_hash[0]); - + /* Unmask the salt. */ calculate_mgf1_and_xor(salt, 0x20, db, 0xDF); /* Unmask the DB. */ calculate_mgf1_and_xor(db, 0xDF, salt, 0x20); - + /* Validate expected salt. */ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x20; i++) { if (expected_label_hash[i] != db[i]) { return 0; } } - + /* Don't validate salt from message[1:0x21] at all. */ - + /* Advance pointer to DB, since we've validated the salt prefix. */ db += 0x20; - + /* DB must be of the form 0000...01 || wrapped_titlekey */ if (*db != 0) { return 0; } - + /* Locate wrapped_titlekey inside DB. */ size_t wrapped_key_offset_in_db = 0; while (wrapped_key_offset_in_db < 0xBF) { @@ -127,13 +123,13 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si return 0; } } - + /* Validate size... */ size_t wrapped_titlekey_size = 0xBF - wrapped_key_offset_in_db; if (wrapped_titlekey_size > dst_size || wrapped_titlekey_size == 0) { return 0; } - + /* Extract the wrapped key. */ memcpy(dst, &db[wrapped_key_offset_in_db], wrapped_titlekey_size); return wrapped_key_offset_in_db; @@ -143,15 +139,15 @@ void tkey_aes_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_siz if (g_tkey_master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) { generic_panic(); } - + const uint8_t titlekek_source[0x10] = { 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x60, 0xE6, 0xB4, 0xD8, 0x78, 0xB8, 0x17, 0x15, 0x98, 0x5E, 0x62, 0x9B }; - + /* Generate the appropriate titlekek into keyslot 9. */ unsigned int master_keyslot = mkey_get_keyslot(g_tkey_master_key_rev); decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, master_keyslot, titlekek_source, 0x10); - + /* Unwrap the titlekey using the titlekek. */ se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, src, 0x10); } diff --git a/exosphere/src/utils.h b/exosphere/src/utils.h index c0a9f7fe8..3aad575c0 100644 --- a/exosphere/src/utils.h +++ b/exosphere/src/utils.h @@ -78,6 +78,26 @@ static inline uint64_t read64le(const volatile void *qword, size_t offset) { return *(uint64_t *)((uintptr_t)qword + offset); } +static inline uint32_t read64be(const volatile void *qword, size_t offset) { + return __builtin_bswap64(read64le(qword, offset)); +} + +static inline void write32le(volatile void *dword, size_t offset, uint32_t value) { + *(uint32_t *)((uintptr_t)dword + offset) = value; +} + +static inline void write32be(volatile void *dword, size_t offset, uint32_t value) { + write32le(dword, offset, __builtin_bswap32(value)); +} + +static inline void write64le(volatile void *qword, size_t offset, uint64_t value) { + *(uint64_t *)((uintptr_t)qword + offset) = value; +} + +static inline void write64be(volatile void *qword, size_t offset, uint64_t value) { + write64le(qword, offset, __builtin_bswap64(value)); +} + static inline unsigned int get_core_id(void) { uint64_t core_id; __asm__ __volatile__ ("mrs %0, mpidr_el1" : "=r"(core_id));