1362 lines
39 KiB
C
Executable File
1362 lines
39 KiB
C
Executable File
/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.82 2020/09/24 17:59:54 jsing Exp $ */
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/*
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* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
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* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <machine/endian.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "pqueue.h"
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#include "bytestring.h"
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static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
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unsigned int len);
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/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
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static int
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satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
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{
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int ret, sat, brw, i;
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if (sizeof(long) == 8)
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do {
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long l;
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if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
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break;
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/* not reached on little-endians */
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/* following test is redundant, because input is
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* always aligned, but I take no chances... */
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if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
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break;
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l = *((long *)v1);
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l -= *((long *)v2);
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if (l > 128)
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return 128;
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else if (l<-128)
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return -128;
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else
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return (int)l;
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} while (0);
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ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
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sat = 0;
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brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
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if (ret & 0x80) {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
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sat |= ~brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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} else {
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for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
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brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
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sat |= brw;
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brw >>= 8;
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}
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}
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brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
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if (sat & 0xff)
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return brw | 0x80;
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else
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return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
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}
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static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
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int len, int peek);
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static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
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static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
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static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr,
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unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
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static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
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unsigned char *priority);
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static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
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/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
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static int
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dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
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{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL *rdata;
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rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL *)item->data;
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ssl3_release_buffer(&S3I(s)->rbuf);
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s->internal->packet = rdata->packet;
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s->internal->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(S3I(s)->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memcpy(&(S3I(s)->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
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memcpy(&(S3I(s)->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
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return (1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
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{
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DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL *rdata;
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pitem *item;
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/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
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if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
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return 0;
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rdata = malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA_INTERNAL));
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item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
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if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
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goto init_err;
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rdata->packet = s->internal->packet;
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rdata->packet_length = s->internal->packet_length;
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memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(S3I(s)->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(S3I(s)->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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item->data = rdata;
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s->internal->packet = NULL;
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
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memset(&(S3I(s)->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL));
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memset(&(S3I(s)->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL));
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
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goto err;
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/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
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if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
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goto err;
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return (1);
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err:
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ssl3_release_buffer(&rdata->rbuf);
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init_err:
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SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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free(rdata);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (-1);
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}
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static int
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
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{
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pitem *item;
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item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
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if (item) {
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dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
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free(item->data);
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pitem_free(item);
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return (1);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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|
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/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
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* yet */
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#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
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&((D1I(s))->unprocessed_rcds))
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|
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/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
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#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
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&((D1I(s))->processed_rcds))
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static int
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dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
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{
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pitem *item;
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item = pqueue_peek(D1I(s)->unprocessed_rcds.q);
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if (item) {
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/* Check if epoch is current. */
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if (D1I(s)->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != D1I(s)->r_epoch)
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return (1);
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/* Nothing to do. */
|
|
|
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/* Process all the records. */
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while (pqueue_peek(D1I(s)->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
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dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
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if (! dtls1_process_record(s))
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return (0);
|
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if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(D1I(s)->processed_rcds),
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S3I(s)->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
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return (-1);
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}
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}
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/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
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* have been processed */
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D1I(s)->processed_rcds.epoch = D1I(s)->r_epoch;
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D1I(s)->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = D1I(s)->r_epoch + 1;
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|
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return (1);
|
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}
|
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|
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static int
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dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
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{
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int i, al;
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int enc_err;
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
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unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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|
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rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec);
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sess = s->session;
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|
|
|
/* At this point, s->internal->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
|
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* and we have that many bytes in s->internal->packet
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|
*/
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rr->input = &(s->internal->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
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|
|
/* ok, we can now read from 's->internal->packet' data into 'rr'
|
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* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
|
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* need to be copied into rr->data by either
|
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* the decryption or by the decompression
|
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* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
|
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* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
|
|
|
|
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
|
|
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
|
|
|
|
/* check is not needed I believe */
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
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goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
|
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rr->data = rr->input;
|
|
|
|
/* enc_err is:
|
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* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
|
|
* 1: if the padding is valid
|
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* -1: if the padding is invalid */
|
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if ((enc_err = tls1_enc(s, 0)) == 0) {
|
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/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
|
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goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
|
|
if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
|
|
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
|
|
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
|
|
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
orig_len = rr->length + rr->padding_length;
|
|
|
|
/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
|
|
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
|
|
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
|
|
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (orig_len < mac_size ||
|
|
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
|
|
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
|
|
orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
|
/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
|
|
* can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
|
|
* the MAC in constant time from within the record,
|
|
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
|
|
* */
|
|
mac = mac_tmp;
|
|
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
|
|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
|
|
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
|
|
rr->length -= mac_size;
|
|
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = tls1_mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */);
|
|
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
|
|
enc_err = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (enc_err < 0) {
|
|
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->internal->packet_length = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
/* So at this point the following is true
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
|
|
* after use :-).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
|
|
s->internal->packet_length = 0;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to get a new input record.
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
|
|
* or non-blocking IO.
|
|
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
|
|
unsigned char *p = NULL;
|
|
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
|
|
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
|
|
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
|
|
if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
|
|
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* get something from the wire */
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
again:
|
|
/* dump this record on all retries */
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->internal->packet_length = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check if we have the header */
|
|
if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
|
|
(s->internal->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
|
|
CBS header, seq_no;
|
|
uint16_t epoch, len, ssl_version;
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
|
|
n = ssl3_packet_read(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
return (n);
|
|
|
|
/* If this packet contained a partial record, dump it. */
|
|
if (n != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
|
|
|
|
CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, s->internal->packet_length);
|
|
|
|
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &epoch) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_bytes(&header, &seq_no, 6))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&seq_no, &(S3I(s)->read_sequence[2]),
|
|
sizeof(S3I(s)->read_sequence) - 2, NULL))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&header, &len))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
rr->type = type;
|
|
rr->epoch = epoch;
|
|
rr->length = len;
|
|
|
|
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
|
|
if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
|
|
if ((ssl_version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* record too long, silently discard it */
|
|
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* now s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&header);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
|
|
|
|
n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length);
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
return (n);
|
|
|
|
/* If this packet contained a partial record, dump it. */
|
|
if (n != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
|
|
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
|
|
if (bitmap == NULL)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
|
|
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
|
|
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
|
|
* since they arrive from different connections and
|
|
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(D1I(s)->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
p != NULL && *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
|
|
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* just read a 0 length packet */
|
|
if (rr->length == 0)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
|
|
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
|
|
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
|
|
* anything while listening.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_next_epoch) {
|
|
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->internal->in_handshake) && !D1I(s)->listen) {
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(D1I(s)->unprocessed_rcds),
|
|
rr->seq_num) < 0)
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
/* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
|
|
}
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
/* Mark receipt of record. */
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, j, ret;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (S3I(s)->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
|
|
if ((type &&
|
|
type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
|
|
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
|
|
if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Now D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
|
|
|
|
if (!s->internal->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
|
|
{
|
|
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start:
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
/* S3I(s)->rrec.type - is the type of record
|
|
* S3I(s)->rrec.data, - data
|
|
* S3I(s)->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
|
|
* S3I(s)->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
|
|
rr = &(S3I(s)->rrec);
|
|
|
|
/* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
|
|
* so process data buffered during the last handshake
|
|
* in advance, if any.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
|
|
pitem *item;
|
|
item = pqueue_pop(D1I(s)->buffered_app_data.q);
|
|
if (item) {
|
|
|
|
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
|
|
|
|
free(item->data);
|
|
pitem_free(item);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for timeout */
|
|
if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
|
|
goto start;
|
|
|
|
/* get new packet if necessary */
|
|
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
|
|
ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
|
ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
|
|
/* anything other than a timeout is an error */
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
else
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (D1I(s)->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
|
|
|
|
if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
|
|
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
|
|
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
|
|
/* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
|
|
* Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
|
|
* buffer the application data for later processing rather
|
|
* than dropping the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(D1I(s)->buffered_app_data),
|
|
rr->seq_num) < 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
|
|
* (even in 'peek' mode) */
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
{
|
|
/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
|
|
* are doing a handshake for the first time */
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
|
|
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
return (len);
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
|
|
if (!peek) {
|
|
rr->length -= n;
|
|
rr->off += n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (n);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
|
|
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
|
|
|
|
/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
|
|
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof D1I(s)->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest = D1I(s)->handshake_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len;
|
|
} else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
dest_maxlen = sizeof(D1I(s)->alert_fragment);
|
|
dest = D1I(s)->alert_fragment;
|
|
dest_len = &D1I(s)->alert_fragment_len;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
|
|
else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
/* Application data while renegotiating
|
|
* is allowed. Try again reading.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
S3I(s)->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
|
|
/* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
|
|
* may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
|
|
if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
|
|
for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
|
|
dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
* D1I(s)->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
|
|
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
|
|
if ((!s->server) &&
|
|
(D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
|
|
(D1I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
|
|
(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
|
|
D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((D1I(s)->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
|
|
(D1I(s)->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
|
|
(D1I(s)->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->msg_callback)
|
|
s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
D1I(s)->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
|
|
!S3I(s)->renegotiate) {
|
|
D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq++;
|
|
s->internal->new_session = 1;
|
|
ssl3_renegotiate(s);
|
|
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (S3I(s)->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
|
|
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (D1I(s)->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
|
|
int alert_level = D1I(s)->alert_fragment[0];
|
|
int alert_descr = D1I(s)->alert_fragment[1];
|
|
|
|
D1I(s)->alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->msg_callback)
|
|
s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
D1I(s)->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->internal->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
|
|
{
|
|
S3I(s)->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
|
|
{
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
S3I(s)->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
|
|
alert_descr);
|
|
s->internal->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
|
|
{
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
|
|
unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
|
|
|
|
/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
|
|
* exactly what the record payload has to look like */
|
|
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
|
|
if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
|
|
(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->msg_callback)
|
|
s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
|
|
rr->data, 1, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
/* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
|
|
* messages are still missing, so just drop it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
|
|
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
|
|
if ((D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
|
|
!s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
|
|
|
|
/* this may just be a stale retransmit */
|
|
if (!dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (rr->epoch != D1I(s)->r_epoch) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
|
|
* client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
|
|
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((S3I(s)->hs.state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
|
|
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
|
|
S3I(s)->hs.state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->internal->new_session = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (S3I(s)->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio;
|
|
/* In the case where we try to read application data,
|
|
* but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
|
|
* the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
|
|
* cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
|
|
bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
|
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
|
|
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (rr->type) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
|
|
if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
|
|
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->internal->in_handshake is set, but that
|
|
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
|
|
* but have application data. If the library was
|
|
* running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
|
|
* is set) and it makes sense to read application data
|
|
* at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
|
|
* we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (S3I(s)->in_read_app_data &&
|
|
(S3I(s)->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
|
|
(((S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(S3I(s)->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(S3I(s)->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
|
|
(S3I(s)->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(S3I(s)->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(S3I(s)->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
|
|
S3I(s)->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* not reached */
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake)
|
|
{
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
|
|
* is started. */
|
|
static int
|
|
have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
|
|
int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
|
|
/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *src = D1I(s)->handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k, n;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while ((len > 0) && (D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < D1I(s)->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
D1I(s)->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(S3I(s)->wbuf);
|
|
size_t out_len;
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL still being written
|
|
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wb->left != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
|
|
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, let's send it */
|
|
if (S3I(s)->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
if ((ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
/* If it went, fall through and send more stuff. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
wb->offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, wb->buf, wb->len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, s->version);
|
|
tls12_record_layer_set_write_epoch(s->internal->rl, D1I(s)->w_epoch);
|
|
|
|
if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type, buf, len, &cbb))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &out_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
wb->left = out_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
|
|
* bad write retries later.
|
|
*/
|
|
S3I(s)->wpend_tot = len;
|
|
S3I(s)->wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
S3I(s)->wpend_type = type;
|
|
S3I(s)->wpend_ret = len;
|
|
|
|
/* We now just need to write the buffer. */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
|
|
{
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
const unsigned char *seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0) {
|
|
memcpy (S3I(s)->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
return 1; /* this record in new */
|
|
}
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
|
|
return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
|
|
else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
|
|
return 0; /* record previously received */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(S3I(s)->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
|
|
{
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
unsigned int shift;
|
|
const unsigned char *seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence;
|
|
|
|
cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
|
|
if (cmp > 0) {
|
|
shift = cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
|
|
bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
|
|
else
|
|
bitmap->map = 1UL;
|
|
memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
shift = -cmp;
|
|
if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
|
|
bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
|
|
|
|
S3I(s)->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
*ptr++ = S3I(s)->send_alert[0];
|
|
*ptr++ = S3I(s)->send_alert[1];
|
|
|
|
i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf));
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
S3I(s)->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
/* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (S3I(s)->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
|
|
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->msg_callback)
|
|
s->internal->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
|
|
S3I(s)->send_alert, 2, s, s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->internal->info_callback;
|
|
else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) {
|
|
j = (S3I(s)->send_alert[0]<<8)|S3I(s)->send_alert[1];
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static DTLS1_BITMAP *
|
|
dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
|
|
if (rr->epoch == D1I(s)->r_epoch)
|
|
return &D1I(s)->bitmap;
|
|
|
|
/* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
|
|
else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(D1I(s)->r_epoch + 1) &&
|
|
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
|
|
*is_next_epoch = 1;
|
|
return &D1I(s)->next_bitmap;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *seq;
|
|
unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(S3I(s)->read_sequence);
|
|
|
|
if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
|
|
D1I(s)->r_epoch++;
|
|
seq = S3I(s)->read_sequence;
|
|
memcpy(&(D1I(s)->bitmap), &(D1I(s)->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
memset(&(D1I(s)->next_bitmap), 0, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
|
|
} else {
|
|
D1I(s)->w_epoch++;
|
|
seq = S3I(s)->write_sequence;
|
|
memcpy(D1I(s)->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(S3I(s)->write_sequence));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
|
|
}
|